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Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the

New Global Politicsl
Ruti G. TeitelThis Article proposes that international law is undergoing a paradigm
shift, which will have significant implicationsfor foreign affairs. A dramatic
expansion of legal machinery, institutions, and processes is occurring in the
internationalsphere. Now, more than ever before foreign policy decision-making occurs in the shadow of the law. The conception of a new rule of law is at
stake; appropriateto the present state of global politics, as it aims to manage
heightened political conflict and violence through law. The impact of the juridical paradigm shift is primarily discursive. The expanded legal discourse represented by the present international human rights system contributes a
rhetoric that both enables and constrains politics; but whose constructive
potential is not infinitely malleable. Understanding this paradigm shift
requires new interpretive principles, which is the larger project for which this
Article lays the foundation.
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Introduction
Serious human rights crises persist despite recent democratization and
progress in international human rights law. This contradictory state suggests that a puzzle exists concerning international law's relation to politics.
Indeed, it suggests that the international legal and political orders are out
of sync. This Article begins by exploring the gap between the apparent
normative progress and political realities and aims to clarify law's role in
international politics.
Existing theory does not adequately account for international law's
bearing upon international affairs in contemporary political circumstances. In fact, the prevailing theorizing in the international realm, which
tends to be highly schematized between realist and idealist views, evidences the separation between legal and political regimes. Realist terminology explains the fitful course of human rights in the late twentiethcentury as a matter of political will. This position does not adequately
clarify the present direction in international law and politics, which
although democratizing implies persistent disorder and violence. This
inadequacy is due in part to the fact that realist lines tend to evaluate foreign affairs as driven exclusively by political circumstances.' Similarly,
idealist views are often inapt to grasp international law's transformed role
in global politics because they tend to privilege formalist and increasingly
2
obsolete conceptions of international law.
There needs to be a move beyond these existing international relations
models because, in light of contemporary changes in law and politics, their
theoretical structures cannot adequately account for present foreign policymaking. A better understanding of the present international legal system's role in contemporary global politics is urgently needed. 3 This Article
argues that an expanded international legal regime structures foreign policymaking and lies at the core of global politics' current transformation.
The expanded juridical discourse penetrates foreign policy realms in new
1. On realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5, 7 (1994). On the relevance of method and interpretive
approaches to international law, see Symposium on Method in International Law, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 291 (1999); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence
War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and
World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 391 (2000) (discussing realism); David Kennedy, The
Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 9, 106 (1999) (discussing convergence of international relations and legal internationalism).
2. See Farer, supra note 1.
3. See generally DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS
AND CULTURE (1999) (discussing the globalization debate and drawing attention to the
dangers of eliding globalization with concepts such as interdependence, integration, universalism, and convergence).
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ways. Its dominant conception of the rule of law is based on the "humanitarian" regime, which is an expanded version of what is traditionally called
the "law of war."'4 For the most part, the enhanced role of the humanitarian regime in contemporary politics is not yet adequately understood,
because it is to some extent still in its infancy and thus lacks a thoroughgoing jurisprudence, 5 particularly with respect to the rights dimensions in
the expanded law of war.
This Article takes the first steps in the project of interpreting the newly
expanded international legal regime by elucidating the significance of
adopting an expanded juridical discourse. Further, this Article aims to
clarify the relevance of international law within the changing constitution
of the globalizing world order. Recent developments in humanitarian law
guide contemporary global politics by structuring international rule of
law's policymaking with respect to the heightened disorder associated with
end-of-century political transformation. This new international legalismor "humanity's law"-assists in framing and legitimating the form of policymaking choices in present global politics.
The new humanitarianism is the rule of law that emerged from a
world of contradictory political conditions. As a rule of law, it comprehends the dimensions of democratization, political fragmentation, and disorder's coexistence. 6 The fall of the Soviet Union and the related rise of
U.S. power, 7 as well as post-Soviet transitions and other recent political and
social transformations, form the context for the paradigm shift now occurring in international law. 8 Political, economic, and technological changes
have had globalizing ramifications that penetrated state borders in ways
that transformed the core rule of law values in the international legal order
and created a shift away from the previously prevailing state-centric system. These globalization processes have numerous ramifications for the
structure of a simultaneously expanding and disaggregating international
4. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE (1998) [hereinafter WAR
J.INT'L. L. 239
CRIMES]; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM.

(2000). On the dimension of human rights in international law, see MYRES S. McDouGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUB148-53, 941-62 (1981).
5. See Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1997).
6. See HELD ET AL., supra note 3; LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS
CONSOLIDATION (1999); KEN JOWITT, NEW WORLD DISORDER: THE LENINIST EXTINCTION

LIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY

(1994) (discussing the political destabilization that occurred as a consequence of the
collapse of communism).
7. See LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD (1994) (focusing on American international hegemony and arguing that

the "legitimacy of international hegemony should be evaluated in the same way as the
legitimacy of other authoritative political structures, particularly domestic
governments").
8.

See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 92 (1998) (referring to an

"unbundling of sovereignty"); Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept.
18, 1999, at 49; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183,
183-84 (1997) (arguing that "the State is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its
separate, functionally distinct parts"); see also PeterJ. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,
70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1223 (1999) (discussing disaggregation of the federal regime).
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legal system and have significant consequences for the rule of law. 9
The present international political context is more democratic' ° yet
also less stable, because increasing political fragmentation creates potential for political violence. 11 Though perhaps paradoxical, the new democratization is largely associated with the post-Cold War transformations, a
time when political violence profoundly increased and a host of inadequately consolidated transitional regimes appeared. 1 2 This new political
reality challenges prevailing assumptions regarding the comparative roles
of dictatorships and democracies in maintaining the peace. 13 Recognition
of the prevailing political conditions of increased violence clarifies the contemporary turn to a dominant conception of global rule of law in terms of
an enlarged law of war.
The primary change in the international legal regime is that humanitarian law has expanded and has a greater reach. Its expanded legal rhetoric
reflects changing conceptions of legitimacy in contemporary international
politics and represents a paradigm shift between divergent conceptions of
the rule of law in the international domain. 14 Understanding the significance of the greater juridicization of international affairs discourse
requires new interpretive principles, which this Article begins to lay forth.
In order to do so, this Article explores the relationship between the
contemporary international law regime and foreign affairs. Part I
introduces the new rule of law and examines the dynamic interaction
between the emerging humanitarian law regime and the rapidly changing
political conditions of global politics. Part 11 analyzes the role of the new
international legalism in foreign affairs. Subsequently, Part III focuses on
the effects of merging the two legal regimes. Finally, Part IV addresses the
role of the legal scheme in globalizing politics, specifically its redefinition
of security in international politics.
9. See

SASSEN

supra note 8, at 92; Slaughter, supra note 8, at 183-84; Spiro, supra

note 8, at 1223.
10. Democracy has grown chiefly in terms of open elections. See generally HELD
AL.,

supra note 3;

LARRY DIAMOND,

ET

DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS CONSOLIDATION

(1999).

11. See generally

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

(David Wippman ed.,

1998) (discussing the contemporary proliferation of ethnic conflict). Recognition of the
increase in world violence was made abundantly clear by the post-September 11 escalation in global terrorism. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 55/
158, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/
158 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55r158.pdf (Jan.
30, 2001) (defining global terrorism); see also Jamie F. Metzl, Information Intervention;
When Switching Channels Isn't Enough, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 15 (1997); Fareed Zakaria, The
Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFr. 22 (1997). Many of these political conditions existed since the Soviet collapse. See JowiTr, supra note 6.
12. See generally JowIT, supra note 6 (discussing political destabilization following
the communist collapse).
13. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE- (Lewis White Beck ed., 1957);
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); MICHAEL DOYLE, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 225 n.23 (1983).
14. For elaboration see infra text accompanying notes 157-72.
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I. Global Rule of Law
This Article contends that the most pronounced change in the international legal system is the dramatic expansion of humanitarian law's reach
through its merger with international human rights law 15 and its attendant
implications for global rule of law. 16 Accordingly, this Part examines
changes in international law that have had the greatest impact on the contemporary transformation of international relations and maintains that the
changing legal regime reconceives the structure, subject and core animating
values of the international system. 17 The legal change that is now occurring at international, regional and domestic levels is coalescing to form a
body of law that elaborates upon changing conceptions of rule of law values, state responsibilities and human rights in a transforming international system. 18 The new global rule of law challenges the international
legal system's prevailing bases and values in a number of ways.
In the emerging regime, humanitarian law's scope has expanded exponentially. This remarkable transformation amounts to a paradigm shift
because it levels the threshold conditions that determine whether an international or national legal regime applies to a given situation. The new
humanitarian regime implies change along several dimensions resulting in
a discourse with a new reach, a jurisdiction with an extended scope, a
reconceptualized personality, and a new institutionalization. These elements are elaborated upon below.
15. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J.
Wheeler eds., 1999); Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
16. For a comprehensive exposition of the contemporary law of war, see generally
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.
17. This argument is distinguishable from constructivist arguments. This Article
argues that the law plays a constitutive role in contemporary politics, but it does not
advocate the constructivist view that these uses necessarily imply expression of determinate values of justice. Indeed, the argument elaborated in my previous work is more
limited and pragmatic. See Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJurisprudence:The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L. J. 2009 (1997) (arguing that in periods of political
change the law can be used to play multiple roles, both constraining and enabling). For
a useful discussion of distinctions between the approaches of constructivism and pragmatism, see Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice, Presented to the Olin Institute's National Security Seminar at
Harvard University (Dec. 2001) (unpublished paper on file with author). For a discussion of constructivism, see MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 2-3 (1996); Martha Finnemore, ConstructingNorms of HumanitarianIntervention, in

THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS

(Peter J.Katzenstein ed., 1996); THE

POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND

7-8, 236, 270-73 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (using an
approach that generally draws on social constructivism); see also ALEXANDER WENDT,
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999) (developing a theory of the international system as a social construction).
18. For illustrations of these developments see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex 11, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) available at http://www.un.org/law/
DOMESTIC CHANGE

icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute] (explicitly referring to and incorporat-

ing national law, as well as explicating its role in spurring contemporary changes in
national law).
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A Discourse with a New Reach

In the new humanitarianism, the normative apparatus of the law of
war, particularly its criminal justice dimension, is expanding beyond its
historic role. International jurisdiction's demonstrable extension is occurring across the dimensions of time and space, and is redefining political
time and boundaries. Historically, international criminal processes were
deployed ex post, or after the peace. However, in the contemporary
moment the law of war is being invoked ex ante, or before war, coming in
much earlier in foreign policy deliberations and at times even in lieu of
military intervention. 19
First, "humanity's law" extends humanitarian law in terms of political
time because it evokes the discourse of justice earlier in policymaking
processes and thus changes the rule of law's role in international politics.
Historically "justice talk" was entirely ex post. International adjudicatory
processes were deployed following international armed conflicts prompted
by state violations of international law, and were used to retroactively
rationalize infringement on state sovereignty. 20 Currently, however the
humanitarian regime comes in much earlier in policy debates, particularly
in deliberations regarding intervention in human rights crises. 2 1 For
example, early introduction of humanitarian law occurred in the deliberations concerning the appropriate international response to the Balkans
conflict. 22 This apparent expansion in international humanitarian regime
gives "justice talk" a bigger role in contemporary foreign policymaking.
Second, the new humanitarian regime creates a spatial transformation
by expanding the humanitarian regime's jurisdiction in terms of territoriality that extends across national borders. Historically, the law of war
applied in times of international conflict. In contrast, it is now more generally applied and extends to situations of internal political conflict. Contemporary humanitarian law reaches well beyond the parameters of
19. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992); Ruti
Teitel, Nuremberg and its Legacy: Fifty Years Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREM-

BERG 44 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). Compare the Allied intervention in World War II
and the post-World War Il Nuremberg Trials with the basis of international community
involvement in Rwanda. In the latter case, the international community relied upon
U.N. Charter, Chapter VII, not for authorization to intervene militarily, but first to place
U.N. observers in the country and subsequently to establish the war crimes tribunal
once the conflict subsided. See Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of
the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 54 Sess. U.N.
Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/
rwanda.report.htm [hereinafter Rwanda Report]; Implications of InternationalResponse
to Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General,in Address to General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg. (AM), U.N. Press Release GA/9595 (1999) (providing highlights of the Secretary-General's opening address to the General Assembly).
20. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 19; WAR CRIMES, supra note 4 (offering a com-

prehensive historical account); Teitel, supra note 5.
21. See Ruti G. Teitel, Bringing the Messiah through the Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS INPOUTICAL TRANSITION: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 177-93 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999).

22. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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international armed conflict to regulate persecution internal to states, 23 as
evidenced in the new treaties, charters, and ad hoc tribunals.2 4 This jurisdictional expansion is further evidenced in the International Criminal
Court's Charter, which redefines offenses by dropping the previously
required nexus to international armed conflict and extending "international jurisdiction" to situations internal to states. 25 The present shift to
an expanded humanitarian law that is generally applicable with or without
international conflict reveals the extent to which the law of war has moved
from international law's periphery to its core. The expanding law of war
challenges the basic category of international human rights law by redefining the threshold conditions of war and peace; 26 this expanded jurisdiction
implies humanitarian law's normalization. As this Article further elaborates below, humanitarian law assists in controlling some of the illiberal
dimensions of contemporary political transitions, thus redefining the sense
of global rule of law.
B. A Jurisdiction with an Extended Scope
Changes in the substantive values of the international legal system are
related to the jurisdictional changes discussed above. The longstanding
statist model has been associated with a concomitant understanding of
international rule of law that defined security on the basis of existing
national borders. Indeed, in the traditional state-centric system the very
basis for human rights was tied to state borders and the principle of nationality. 27 This longstanding perception is now giving way to an alternative
23. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 11-19 (setting out the Court's jurisdiction); see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 (incorporating, for the first time, "armed conflict not of an international character"
into the lexicon of the Law of War) [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704,
Annex (1993), as amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166
(1998), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
The Rwanda precedent makes this clear as the offences only relate to internal conflict.
For discussion of some of these developments, see Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 554, 554-55 (1995) (noting that
despite some states' efforts "to limit the reach of international law applicable to noninternational armed conflicts, the criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have contributed significantly to the development of international humanitarian
law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts"). The first case prosecuted
by the ICTY dealt with this issue. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment
in Sentencing Appeals, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 635 (ICTY App. Chamber, Jan. 26, 2000).
24. See ICC Statute, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. Id.

26. See U.N.

CHARTER,

art. 1.

27. In the traditional nation-state regime, the protection of individual human rights
was connected to nationality. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 93-94, 1251-52 (2d ed. Oxford

2000).
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view of the meaning of global order, as evidenced in the present expansion
28
of the treaty regime defining the law of war.
The merger between humanitarian law and human rights law gives
rise to a complicated and somewhat contradictory legal regime that challenges the very basis of longstanding notions of international rule of law.
Whereas international rule of law was defined in terms relating to state
sovereignty and self-determination, there is now a shift to a juridical definition of the state and an alternative discourse framed in the universalizing
29
language of human rights.
C.

A Reconceptualized Personality

Transformations in the new legal regime's subject transcend changes
relating to its values and jurisdictional parameters. The traditional statecentered view of personality predicated on the view of the state as the relevant subject of the international regime, 30 has numerous implications for
the meaning of international rule of law, such as the understanding of
equality and reciprocity as the cardinal rule of law principles governing
international relations. 3 1 Consequentially, the protection of territorial sov32
ereignty traditionally defined the international rule of law.
In contrast, the new paradigm weds traditional humanitarianism with
the law of human rights, causing a shift away from states 3 3 as the domi35
34
nant subjects of international law to include "persons" and "peoples.
28.

See infra notes 40-44; see also INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON

Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:

CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSE,

LESSONS LEARNED

(2000), available at http://www.kosovocommission.org/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2002).
29. For a discussion of human rights as a language, see Kathryn Sikkink, Activists
Beyond Borders, in MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY

NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

211 (1997);

NEIL MACCORMICK, QUES-

TIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 175,

177-78, 180-81 (1999); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of
Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 505, 537 (1996) (discussing the role of judicial
discourse).
30. See D. P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed. 1970); STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1. A. Shearer ed., 11th ed. 1994) (arguing that states are the principal
subjects of international law); see also ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 39 (1994) (discussing the classic view that international law applies to states, and arguing that there is growing perception that
international law is relevant to international actors other than states).
31. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4); see generallyJ. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949).

32. The central principles of state sovereignty are legal equality in relation to other
states and the right to be free from the use of force against its territorial integrity. See
Ruti Teitel, National Sovereignty, 3 LEGAL AFE. 26-27 (2002).

33. See infra text accompanying note 58;

GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE

Teubner ed., 1997).
34. See generally A. H. Robertson, HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights, in

(Gunther
ETUDES

ET

ESSAIS SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIx-RoUGE/
STUDIES [STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCI-

PLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET] 793 (C. Swinarski ed., 1984) (discussing the historical

protections accorded to individuals under international humanitarian law); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999)

(discussing the contemporary treatment of individuals in international law).
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A tiered subjectivity comes into relief in the extended legal personality of
the expanded humanitarian regime. The nation-state is no longer the sole
subject of international law because the new regime is also potentially
applicable to groups and persons. These developments in the transforming
juridical discourse reflect the paradigm shift now underway in the conceptualization of international rule of law. This new subjectivity is evident in
the heightened enforcement of the expanded norms, which are directed
beyond states to persons and peoples. 36 These new enforcement structures
are elaborated upon below.
D. A New Institutionalization
Finally, another dimension of the juridical transformation is its
enforcement and entrenchment through international institutionalization.
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable expansion
in the institutionalization of international law. 3 7 These new institutions,
which range from the international courts to nongovernmental organizations, 38 mediate both public and private realms.
Currently, the humanitarian regime is being entrenched through
codifications chartering new international judicial institutions that make
39
criminal justice the primary means of enforcing international rights law.
Although international criminal tribunals began on an ad hoc basis, they
have become the international community's primary response to humanitarian crises. A consensus on establishing a new institution dedicated to
ongoing international adjudication of violations of humanitarian law 40 is
seen in the convening of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the Balkans and
Rwanda, 4 1 leading to the recent establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. Consequently, there is now a turn to an expanded
discourse of international criminal justice. 42 The charters that form bases
of the new international tribunals complicate traditional understandings of
35. For a discussion of "peoples," see

JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999);

Slaughter, supra note 8, at 183-84 (discussing disaggregation in globalizing politics).
36. On the merger of international humanitarian law and human rights law, see ICC
Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (defining "crimes against humanity" and proscribing
"persecution against any identifiable group of collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . grounds" as part of "widespread or systematic
attack directed against one, civilian population." Id. at (h)); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Jurisdiction Appeal (stating that "a state sovereignty
approach has been gradually supplanted by a human being oriented approach"); Louis
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES

16-17 (1995).

37. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
38. One aspect of these new regulatory structures involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For an elaboration of their role, see MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN
SIKKINK,

ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY

NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

(1997).
39. See ICC Statute, supra note 18
40. Id. The ICC Statute became active when sixty ratifications were obtained. There
are presently eighty-four ratifications and one hundred thirty-nine signatures. See http:/
/iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratificationshtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).
41. See ICTY Statute, supra note 23; ICTR Statute, supra note 23.
42. See ICC Statute, supra note 18.
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the law of war, the parameters of war and peace and the state's duties to its
citizens, 43 by extending international jurisdiction beyond national borders
44
and situations of conflict to penetrate states during times of peace.
The establishment of an international regime that contemplates the
coercive enforcement of humanitarian law reflects a reconceptualization of
the rule of law in the international order. The aim of the newly established
enforcement machinery in the form of independent international institutions dedicated to enforcing humanitarian law supports the perception of a
heightened international rule of law. These new international institutions
incorporate criminal sanctions into the international legal system. Criminal sanctions are a distinctive dimension of legal norms and can plausibly
be used to signal and reinforce the difference between general and positive
law norms. 45 Moreover, criminal sanctions have distinctive constructive
46
potential.
Changes concerning the central elements of the expanded humanitarian regimes primarily signal a move towards a greater juridicization of
foreign affairs. This shift illustrates the law's new constructivist potential. 4 7 A new discourse in the international realm enables the reconceptualization of present international political circumstances, and an attendant
redirecting of the course of current foreign policy deliberations and policy.
The constitutive relation of law and politics in international affairs is a
complex dynamic. At minimum, the new juridical approach allows law to
reframe and shift the parameters of existing politics. The next Part
explores some of the implications of international legalism's rise, as well as
its relation to the politics of globalization.
43. See Developments in InternationalCriminal Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
44. On the challenge to the differentiation of international and internal conflicts, see
ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7 (concerning jurisdiction for crimes against humanity); Tadic decision of 2 October 1995, c 148-134; see also Ruti Teitel, supra note 21, at
184 (arguing that the ICTY expanded the international criminal jurisdiction first established at the Nuremberg Trials to cover "crimes against humanity" even when they occur
wholly within the state). The ICTR evidences another instance of expansion of international criminal jurisdiction which, while an international tribunal, prosecuted solely
intrastate crimes committed in the Rwandan genocide. See ICTR Statute, supra note 23,
at art. 4.
45. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-14 (Oxford 1961) (discussing the uses of sanctions for norm strengthening functions in domestic law); JUDITH

N.

SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS

(1986) (discussing legalism as

an ideology internal to the legal profession and, more importantly for the purposes of
this Article, as political ideology). Growing emphasis on positivism in international law
has tended to derive largely from American jurisprudence. See ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998); Teitel supra note 17, at 2016-30 (offering
a comparative perspective to positivism in the rule of law).
46. To date, there has been little exploration of the distinctive contribution of criminal law to the constructivist theory of law. On constructivism generally, see supra note
17 and accompanying text. In particular, the question arises of whether the role of
coercive sanctions should be accounted for within the context of traditional international law premised on consent or within constructivist theory generally premised on
other techniques of persuasion. This Article attempts to advance this question. See infra
text accompanying notes 93-100.
47. For some of the scholars advocating constructivism in the law, see supra note 17
and accompanying text; see also RUTi G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 4-6 (2000).
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II.

"Humanity's Law

The New International Legalism

The purpose of analyzing the expanded humanitarian legal regime,
particularly its influence on international affairs, is to provide a better
understanding of the paradigm shift. Understanding this shift, which is
caused by the new juridical regime and its influence in the international
realm, should clarify contemporary changes in international politics.
A better understanding of changing legal and political realities
requires new interpretive approaches to international law. 48 In the prevailing interpretive approach, international law tends to be externalized and
thus largely understood as a mere epiphenomenon of international politics. 4 9 Moreover, theorizing on the law's relation to politics tends to be unidirectional in that political practices are treated as potential sources of
50
norms, but not the other way around.
By contrast, the interpretive approach advanced for here is a more
dynamic, interactive relationship between international law and politics.
This approach asserts that the emerging legal regime plays a role in shaping
current political policymaking, chiefly by reframing and restructuring the
discourse in international affairs in a legalist direction. 5 1 The expanded
humanitarian regime, operating in the context of its new institutionalization, articulates a transformed structure and justificatory process that aim
to rationalize and legitimate contemporary foreign policy, particularly as it
relates to globalization.
To begin, the threshold dimension of the changes in the emerging
international law regime affect the contemporary humanitarian law developments by transforming the structure of the international lawmaking
processes. The emerging humanitarian regime transforms and diversifies
international lawmaking processes. Classically, the state was the primary
agency of norm-making in the international system, 5 2 conventional lawmaking dominated the international sphere, and international law,
whether "conventional" or "customary," was defined in terms of state consent and practice. 5 3 Although this characterization is an over simplification, the state-centered paradigm is now dated, 54 contemporary norm
making in the international realm is not simply an expression of interstate
48. These are highly schematic here but will be elaborated on further in a larger
project in progress.
49. Moreover, within international affairs the "realist" perspective sees the rule of
law largely as a function of politics. See supra note 1; see also supra note 41.
50. On the sources of law, see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
51. Some of the ramifications of this structuring of the political discourse are taken
up infra in Part IV.
52. See ICJ Statute, supra note 50; see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
53. Namely, treaties and customary law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33]. (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980); ICJ Statute,
supra note 50, at art. 38. See generally MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

185 (3d ed. 1999); infra note 57.

54. See infra note 57.
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relations. 5 5 In the global context of fragmented power, other agents,
namely private parties, non-governmental actors and transnational institutions, play a growing role in the production of international law. 56 These
changes in international lawmaking processes go to the core of the existing
structure and mechanisms of the international regime 57 and affect aspects
of both political and legal sovereignty. Transformation in the sites and
processes of international lawmaking reflect a shift in the legitimacy and
authority of international law, with ambivalent ramifications for the new
international humanitarian regime's transformation. Diversification in the
sites of international norm making parallels the general economic and
political expansion outward that characterizes industrialized states. 5 8 As
such, these changes ultimately redound to the legitimization of globalization processes. Indeed, what emerges is an apparently globalized
59
jurisprudence.
The advent of a new international legalism signals enhanced legitimacy for international law. Historically, international law was commonly
thought to lack national law's traditional forms of legitimacy; namely the
authority associated with state sovereignty. In the present globalizing
order, however there is an evident shift in the sources of international law's
authority as well as in the perception of its legitimacy. 60 The humanitarian
regime's expanded reach is best understood in relation to the broader phenomenology of globalization, because changes in international law relate
to the present conditions of global politics.
55. This is recognized in recent scholarship that emphasizes the growth of transnational law and focuses on the rise in transnational juridification. See Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 (1997); KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 38; Slaughter, supra note 8 at 183-97. However, this scholarly writing
does not explicitly address the direction in the expansion of the international regime.
See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 390 (outlining the shift in the role of law in international politics, but observing that legal scholars have failed to analyze the larger context
of legalization).
56.

See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1992);

FRANCK, supra note 34; Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporationsand Developing
Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748 (1983); P. K. Menon, The International
Personalityof Individuals in InternationalLaw: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151 (1992). For example, the European Convention of Human
Rights allows individuals to bring complaints. Recent decades have seen dramatic expansion in access by individual claimants. In some fashion, this process allows individuals
to make international law. See European Commission of Human Rights, Survey of Activities and Statistics 1991, at 21 (1992).
57. As traditionally understood international law making consists largely of state
agreements via treaty lawmaking. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-180 (1927); J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PEACE (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.

1963).
58. Regarding this phenomenon of globalization see generally supra note 33; HELD
ET AL., supra note 3; SASSEN, supra note 8.
59. There is a growing literature on this globalized jurisprudence. See, e.g., WILLIAM
TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (William Twining & Christopher McCrudden eds., 2000); GI.OBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 33; TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCtESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).

60. For an elaboration, see infra text accompanying notes 69-79.
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The change in the perception of international law's legitimacy is
occurring now for several reasons, all of which relate to a number of
domestic and international developments. First, the enhancement of international law's authority relates to significant changes in political conditions on the domestic front through the weakening of national institutions.
This weakening occurs in newly transitional states, 6 1 although the impact
of the globalization process is also felt in consolidated nation-states. 62 The
international legal system's transformation has evident domestic ramifications, particularly regarding foreign affairs decision-making processes 6 3 as
evidenced in a recently invigorated debate in the United States over the
appropriate role of international law in the American constitutional
64
scheme.
The international humanitarian regime's enhanced legal potential is
also attributable to multiple institutional changes on the international
61. This phenomenon is associated with the most significant change in contemporary political circumstances-the Soviet collapse. On weak nation-states, see Stephen
Holmes, Can Weak-State Liberalism Survive? Paper presented at New York University
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Spring 1997) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
62. An illustration is evident in the case of General Pinochet. See Regina v. Bartle, 2
W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.), reprinted in 2 All E.R. 97 (1999) and 38 I.L.M. 581

(1999).
63. A leading precedent in this regard was the extradition of Augusto Pinochet and
its effects in the international realm and upon domestic decision-making. See Menno T.
Kamminga, Lessons Learnedfrom the Exercise of UniversalJurisdictionin Respect of Gross
Human Rights Offenses, 23 HuM. RTs. Q. 940 (2001) (discussing the expanding reach of
universal jurisdiction to adjudicate). See generally Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony
and InternationalLaw: Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the
New InternationalOrder, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
64. The question central to this debate is: "To what extent is international law part
of national law?" See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley & Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 371,
376-77 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 528-29 (1997); Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1555, 1569
(1984); see, e.g., Symposium: ForeignAffairs Law at the End of the Century, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1089 (1999). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State
Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (favoring the existing rule of treating international
law as federal law) with Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815
(1997) (arguing that customary international law should not have the status of federal
law, in the absence of authorization from the federal political branches); compare Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995)
(arguing for a broad interpretation of the treaty power whereby both the House and the
Senate may conclude congressional-executive agreements as treaties with a mere majority) with Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (arguing for a
narrower view of the sources of proper treaty-making authority). This interpretive
debate is associated with other related questions, namely about the role of non-executive
political actors in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1998); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (denying states the
power to make their own international human rights policy); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The
Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing"
Treaties, 67 CHI, KENT L. REV. 515, 532 (1991) (discussing the interpretation and effect
of non self-executing declarations).
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front; namely developments in the juridical regime such as the newly
chartered international legal institutions and related proceedings. 6 5 The
new humanitarian regime reconceives core international law principles
regarding sovereignty and personality in the international order, and transforms dimensions of state obligations and individual rights in a globalizing
politics. The new legal lexicon links the evolving political changes associated with globalization processes with changing standards relating to the
protection of humanitarian rights in the international realm.
Thus, in the transforming legal regime there is a shift in the relevant
locus of authority from the national to the international and from the state
to transnational institutions and other political actors implicated in various
dimensions of globalization processes. 6 6 This demonstrable move to law,
with or without the state, represents a turn to an alternative source of
authority, a development that relates to the aims of globalizing politics. 67
A. The Rhetoric of Justice
When it is understood in the context of the heightened political disorder associated with the last two decades, the turn to humanitarian law and
legal processes reveals the extent to which international criminal justice
has become the basis for the now emergent global rule of law.66 The turn
to humanitarian law represents a move, not only to an increased and
expanded legalism, but also to a distinctive discourse of justice.
To begin, a historical vantage point elucidates the extent to which contemporary rule of law's meaning in the international realm has become
more and more coincident with international criminal justice. 69 The
meaning of international rule of law has evolved over time and reflects the
accumulation of the use of law to manage conflict. A century's experience
lays the basis for the use of international criminal justice to legitimate inter65. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 11-19; see also Geneva Convention 1,
supra note 23; ICTY Statute, supra note 23; ICTR, supra note 23; Meron, supra note 23, at
554-55 (noting that despite some states' efforts "to limit the reach of international law
applicable to non-international armed conflicts, the criminal tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have contributed significantly to the development of international humanitarian law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts").
66. There is a growing literature on the emergence of relevant actors. See KECK &
SIKKINK, supra note 38.
67. These uses of international justice are analogous to other historical instances of
the use of law to regulate faraway territories through royal law and colonial law. See
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:

A

COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

23 (1981) (noting that

a major function of courts in many societies is to assist in holding the countryside,
providing an extraterritorial court to adjust relations among the occupying cadres
according to their own rules, as well as a body of national law in order to facilitate
central administration).
68. See TEITEL, supra 47, at 33-39.
69. As a historical matter, this is exemplified by the emphasis in the Nuremberg
Tribunals on the prosecution of the arch offenses of "aggression" and the "crime against
the peace." For an extensive historical account, see TAYLOR, supra note 19; Teitel, supra
note 19, at 44.
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national intervention. 70 Contemporary humanitarian law is grounded on
the preexisting scheme of the law of war where the legal precedents of the
last century and more particularly, the human rights crises of the twentieth
72
century, 7 1 continue to guide the emerging humanitarian law regime.
This conventional framework lays the basis for the now transformed rule of
73
law reflected in the prevailing international regime.
Currently, the humanitarian scheme is being applied to changing
political circumstances. The core predicates of the postwar regime are
undergoing a substantial transformation that goes to the basic structure
and core values of the international legal system. However, these changes
are hardly self-evident, nor do they comport easily with intuitions about
the present direction of international law. rherefore, a better understanding of the constitutive interaction of law and politics necessitates the application of interpretive principles regarding the historical development of the
international legal domain. From a positive law perspective, the historical
law of war has expanded to merge with peacetime human rights law to
constitute the new humanitarian regime. The evident tension in the background conditions of international humanitarian law-beyond war to
peacetime-is definitional, as it moves the boundaries of the law of war
beyond international armed conflict. In the contemporary moment, the
humanitarian legal regime reaches beyond the realm of international relations as historically understood and transcends traditional international
armed conflict to reach other situations of conflict occurring within the
74
nation state.
70. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 51-63 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing
the legalist paradigm).
71. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 7.
72. See Teitel, supra note 5, at 301-15. Historically, the paradigmatic bases are the
two predecessor international legal regimes established, first, by the Westphalia treaty
after the Religious Wars, and then subsequently by the treaties following World War I.
On the development of the law of war, see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE (2000); see generally WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.
73. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994); Geneva Convention 1,
supra note 23; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
1, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1979), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442.
74. For discussion of this issue in the context of a case challenging the jurisdiction
of the ICTY, insofar as it extends beyond international armed conflict, see Prosecutorv.
Tadic (Judgment), Case No. IT-94-I-A, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
(App. Chamber, July 15, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1518 (1999); reprinted in 94 AM.J. INT'L. L. 571
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-IAR12, Jurisdiction Appeal Case (1995) (referring to the distinction between international and internal conflict as "more and more blurred, and international legal rules
have increasingly have been agreed upon to regulate internal armed conflicts"); see also
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.
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The broader significance of this transformation is that the now emerging rule of law transforms the historical values associated with the longstanding Westphalia international security arrangement, which is
primarily understood in terms of the stability of state borders. 75 Moreover,
the preexisting regime conceived of rights as nationality-based and protected by the sovereign state. Just as the prior international legal regime,
premised on state sovereignty and self-determination, was associated with
the growth of modern nationalism, 76 the new legal developments of the
emergent humanitarian law regime are associated with the contemporary
phenomena of political transition and globalization. The expanded
humanitarian legal regime reestablishes the meaning of rule of law in the
new global politics. Linking international criminal law to the broader project of peacemaking, the new codifications transcend ordinary rule of law
values while giving expression to dynamic norms that reconstruct the rele77
vant understandings of international security.
In the new humanitarianism, rule of law is not solely defined in terms
of the prevailing statist lexicon of national self-determination and state
sovereignty. Instead, the new discourse goes to the very core of the prevailing paradigm. The present move shifts the emphasis from the protection of
state borders or territoriality, which is the core of the established state system, to other more juridical dimensions of the state such as the stability of
peoples. 78 The transformed discourse is appropriate for contemporary
globalizing politics because it complements the prevailing state-centered
approach and its attention to the protection of state borders, with an
approach that is predicated on alternative humanitarian concerns.
B. The Role of Humanitarian Discourse in the New Global Politics
Currently, there is a heightened reliance on law, legal processes, and
judicial structures in international politics, which raises a question about
how to interpret these judicial developments. The emerging international
75. Compare R. B. J. Walker & Saul H. Mendlovitz, InterrogatingState Sovereignty, in
CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY

1 (R. B. J. Walker & Saul

H. Mendlovitz eds., 1990) (arguing that states no longer pretend to be autonomous and
that the most important forces affecting people's lives are global in scale and consequence), with RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM

GROTIUS TO KANT

(1999) (contending for transformation in

the values of state autonomy over time).
76. See STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY

182-83 (1999) (dis-

cussing the link between the rise of nationalism and international legal sovereignty).
77. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 51, 52, 53 in light of U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. These
provisions attempt to reconcile the statist norm of sovereignty with the growing justifications for international humanitarian intervention. Increasingly, humanitarian intervention is being justified under U.N. Charter, art. 52(1)'s authorization of regional
"enforcement action." See Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 824, 827-28
(1999) (noting that proponents of a "living Charter" would support an interpretation of
the law and an adaptation of UN procedures). For critical discussion of the notion of an
evolving right of humanitarian intervention, see GRAY, supra note 72, at 26-31 (evaluating the notion of a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26 (discussing population permanence).
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humanitarian legal regime supports a transformation of global politics
through its articulation of an international discourse of rule of law. 79 Several dimensions of this regime are discussed below. Global rule of law
both enables and restrains power in today's political circumstances in
order to manage new conditions of political disorder through the rubric of
law.
In the absence of a common world government ° or bank,8 1 it is the
humanitarian legal regime that is used to lend authority and legitimacy to
the international realm through its tribunals, proceedings, juridical language, and public justificatory processes. Humanitarian law and courts
are the preeminent institutions and processes aimed at managing present
global politics and representing the legalist view on how to advance the
8 2
core international rule of law's goal of ending political violence.
Greater reliance on the judiciary is both a distinct institutional
response and an alternative process for resolving international controversies. There are multiple bases for this institutional shift: New humanitarianism is the rule of law for contemporary political circumstances of
heightened political disorder.8 3 Historically, courts have performed the
societal function of managing social conflict, particularly concerning the
governance of far-away territories.8 4 This managerial role has reemerged
79. On the role of human rights language, see Ruti Teitel, The Future of Human Rights
Discourse, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 449, 454-58 (2002); Ruti Teitel, Millennial Visions:
Human Rights at Century's End in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITION: GETTYSBURG TO
BOSNIA 339-42 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Introduction, U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1999 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (released Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://
www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999_hrp-report/overview.html
(referring
to human rights as one of three "universal languages"). Koh describes this "third globalization" as "the rise of transnational human rights networks of both public and private
actors." Id. at xv; See also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 38. See generally Louis HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE 42-44, 88-90, 93 (2d ed. 1979). On law as language, see generally James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985) (suggesting that law is most usefully seen as a
branch of rhetoric and defining rhetoric as "a central art by which community and culture are established, maintained, and transformed").
80. See Andrew Strauss & Richard Falk, For a Global People's Assembly, INT'L HERALD
TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), Nov. 14, 1997, OP/ED at 8, available at http://
www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/falk.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2002); Richard Falk &
Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of
Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000).
81. As in unified Europe. See, e.g., Patrick Deller, The European System of Central
Banks: Quo Vadis?, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 (1999); John Linarelli, The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 373
(1995). On other unifying conceptions of Europe, see J. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).
82. See Teitel, supra note 21 at 177-93 (1999); see generally SHKLAR, supra note 45
(discussing legalism).
83. These political circumstances have been characterized as those of "small wars
and weak states." See Jack Straw, Mercenaries:Mad Mike Comes in from the Cold, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002, at 55; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
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in recent politics. 85 The' judiciary's established management functions
clarify the remarkable resurgence of extraterritorial law and courts associated with globalization. Once again, as in colonial times, the legal system's
extension and penetration goes beyond the scope of existing political sovereignty. Law's jurisdiction extends beyond state borders to non-state actors,
8' 6
thus, echoing earlier historical understandings of the "law of nations.
Under the global rule of law regime, political controversies are plausibly
adjudicated by faraway third party judiciaries. These political circumstances, where courts operate on their own and lack other effective global
mechanisms, highlight the singularly constructive potential of the law.
In its rhetorical function, the language of justice is mediating, building
upon international adjudicative processes to help manage and legitimate
international conflict. Indeed, the expanded humanitarian regime contemplates both the expression and enforcement of norms. This potential for
judicial enforcement gives the new law norms a sense of reality. The current paradigm shift enables a move away from a purely political discourse
of state interests vindicable in collective exercises of self-determination, to
legalist rhetoric of rights vindicable in courts of law.8 7 Juridical processes
amenable to resolution convert matters of policy into matters of law. 88 The
new international legalism's regular justificatory processes offer the potential for rationalizing international policymaking. 8 9 Structured processes of
justification create a sense of a global order.
Humanitarian norms constitute the emerging global order and serve a
primarily discursive function. More and more, a depoliticized legalist language of right and wrongs, duties and obligations, is supplanting the dominant political language based on state interests, deliberation, and
consensus. An expanded humanitarian discourse offers an alternative
basis for global governance, one in which the notion of rule of law is
largely discursive and international legalism plays a distinctly constructive
role. 90 Law in transformative periods both enables and constrains political
power. It enables a redefining and reconceptualizing of the interests at
stake in international conflict. This is a change from conventional terms
where security was defined largely in terms of state interests because now
LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK (1975)
nial courts); SHAPIRO supra note 67,

85. See

86. On

SHAPIRO,

(explaining that this was particularly true of coloat 23.
supra note 67 (providing a comparative analysis of courts).

globalization generally, see HELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 62-87; TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 385-89. For historical discussion of the "law
of nations," see W. BLACKSTONE, Four Commentaries on the Laws of England 67 (1st ed.
1765-1769); see also HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELL] AC PACIS 16 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1913).
87. See generally HART, supra note 45; SHKLAR, supra note 45.
88. The turn to the language of law mediates the rhetoric of pure politics, on the one
hand, and pure moralism on the other. On this point, see HART, supra note 45 at
212-22, 225-26; see also HENKIN, supra note 79, at 42-44, 88-90, 93 (2d ed. 1979).
89. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the ICTY's relation to
NATO intervention in Kosovo).
90. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895-96, 901-02, 904 (1998).
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the new humanitarian rights terminology defines the meaning of security
more broadly in terms of the preservation of stability across national lines
and population permanence.
C. The Uses of International Criminal Law
The humanitarian legal regime is well suited for a changing global
politics, because the language of criminal justice enables the reconceptualizing of conflict from the local and national to the global, and responsibility from the collective to the individual. Through the humanitarian legal
regime's institutions and processes, a formerly purely local conflict exclusively amenable to domestic management is transformable into a situation
meriting international attention. The new rule of law reconceives and
delimits the prevailing principles of state sovereignty and self-determination in the global order by rendering national and international regulation
ambiguous. By so doing, the new legalism offers a basis for reconceptualizing relevant interests in contemporary politics.
International criminal law processes appear to play a particularly
important role in globalization because they enable a degree of reconceptualization of the public and private realms. International criminal law has
significant constructive potential because international criminal enforcement introduces substantial flexibility into the characterization of conflict
situations. Further, the expanded enforcement associated with the international law of armed conflict enables the transformation of traditional
understandings of responsibility in the international sphere from the
national to the international, and from the collective to the individual. 9 1
Expanded enforcement lends new authority to the recognition of added
legal personality in the globalizing system. 92 This process of piercing the
veil of state power began at Nuremberg, where the post-World War II Charter went beyond existing international law to reconstruct alternative concepts of international and criminal law jurisdiction. A core change
emerging from the merger of the laws of war and human rights is the ongoing application of the rules of the regime beyond states.
As visible in the new international criminal codes, the scope of international criminal law has been entirely reconceived with extended jurisdiction to regulate the use of force beyond states. 9 3 In this post-Westphalia
rule of law regime, both state and non-state actors are potential subjects of
91. See Teitel, supra note 21, at 177.
92. To some extent, this notion of "new" personality is in fact a reversion to an earlier understanding of the subjects of international law of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a more comprehensive
view of the scope of the "law of nations." See BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at 66-67
(discussing the then application of international law to individuals).
93. See ICC statute, supra note 18; Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Analytical
Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, para. 74 (1998).
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the new legal system. 94 This growing importance of non-state actors in
globalism is perhaps most evident in the law of human rights because the
individual is preeminently its subject. 95 In this regard, the recently
expanded humanitarian regime goes beyond the traditional law of war and
its categorical distinctions of war and peace and combatant and civilian to
96
propose a broader view of protected status and personality in the system.
Although to some extent international criminal law builds upon
existing understandings of rule of law in the domestic context, particularly
in the present political circumstances, the uses and forms of criminal law
in the international setting are distinguishable from those of their domestic
counterpart. Law does not have a unitary logic. The new international
legalism has been heralded as a form of transformative jurisprudence with
the ambitious aim of laying the foundation for global society in the absence
of predicate political consensus or accountability. In the new humanitarianism, law guides the definition of a transforming global rule of law, and
thus serves a mediating function. 9 7 The new humanitarianism's primary
role is to offer a coherent discourse that rationalizes the dimensions of
current foreign policy and supports the international judicial regime's
move from its historical guardianship of nationalist politics to its contemporary guardianship of a globalizing politics.
III.
A.

The Effects of the Merger of Two Legal Regimes
Globalizing the Law of War

Parts I and II discuss the constitutive aspects of the new humanitarianism, particularly the dimensions of its potential applicability to foreign
affairs. This section examines the ramifications of the extended humanitarian regime on international law. The newly entrenched humanitarian
regime is an odd hybrid of two previously autonomous legal regimes: the
law of war and the law of human rights. Their merger has significant
ramifications for both regimes, as well as for the international legal system
as a whole. The awkward fit between the law of war and the international
human rights regime exposes the tension and incoherence in both regimes.
Their merger, particularly seen in the expansion of humanitarian discourse, has numerous effects that alter international law's process of lawmaking, structure, subject, and values.
94. See Regina v. Bartle, 2 W.L.R 827 (H.L. 1999) reprinted in 2 All E.R.97 (1999)
and 38 I.L.M. 581, 644 (1999) (discussing the evolution of the concept of individual
responsibility under international law).

95. See

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY

63-98,

109-13, 166-67 (AMY GUTTMAN ed., 2001) (discussing the individual's place in human
rights law); see generally McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 4; FRANCK, supra note 34.
96. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Case 7920, Ser. C., No. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 35, OEA/
ser. L/V/ll.19 doc. 13 (1988); reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 4 (1988); supra note 17 and accompanying text (judgment of July 29, 1988).
97. For a discussion of law's role in this process of global political transition and the
constructive force of international humanitarian law as incorporated in national criminal adjudications, see Teitel, supra note 32, at 20-21, 33-34; see also SHKLAR, supra note
45 at 130.
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At the same time it extends the humanitarian regime, the attempted
merger poses a threat to the continued existence of an independent international human rights discourse. Indeed, as is elaborated below, the displacement of the established human rights vocabulary by that of the law of
war goes to the very heart of the meaning of "human rights."
The merger of these two regulatory schemes complicates the concept
of protected status as well as the related understandings of subjectivity and
personality in international law. First, consider the extent to which the law
of war limits state action in periods of conflict 9 8 and human rights law
limits state behavior in periods of peace. 99 Historically, the law of war had
an internal perspective because it was understood to involve states consensually agreeing to constrain themselves by setting the bounds of permissible conflict. In contrast, the law of human rights had an external
perspective, as persons were protected independently from their nationstate, potentially altogether independent of state action. 10 0 At the juncture
of these two regimes, emerges a dichotomous constitutional self.
Humanitarian law's expansion is generally regarded as a humanizing
and progressive step,' 0 1 because the expanded regime extends the protections of the law of war beyond the conditions of international armed conflict 10 2 to citizens in peacetime. 1 0 3 Whereas, under the law of war the
parameters of normative protection are themselves defined by the character
of the conflict; 10 4 in human rights law the relevant protected status is
accorded on other bases.' 0 5 However, the historical law of war had given
rise to an apparent perversity in international law; a gap whereby nonnationals obtained greater protection than nationals under international
law. 10 6 After all, historically the law of war protected so-called "enemy"
10 7
aliens in conditions of international armed conflict.
The expanded humanitarian law reconciles this contradiction. In the
globalized humanitarian regime, contracting states no longer have monopolistic power over the protection of their citizens' rights. This expansion in
the scope and subject of humanitarian law has progressive normative con98. See supra note 23.
99. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
100. See Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 74 & 75, CC-2/82, Inter-Am. CER, Series A,
No. 2, para. 30 (982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983).
101. See Meron, supra note 4.
102. Those protected included noncombatants in situations of armed conflict. See
WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.
103. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 4; HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES INBOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

1-2 (1992).

104. See Geneva Conventions, supra notes 23 and 73.

105. On human rights theory, see THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984);
Maurice Cranston, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS (Ellan Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1973); Yoram
Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: International HumanitarianLaw, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345, 347 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
106. See Geneva Convention, supra note 23 (discussing treatment of combatants);
Dinstein, supra note 105, at 345, 347.
107. See WAR CRIMES, supra note 4.
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sequences because extending human rights beyond nationality is an important move away from status. Yet, as is elaborated below, the gain is modest
because even under the new global rule of law the relevant ascriptive status
remains complicated, beyond nationality to subnational and transnational
status. Therefore, the central normative work of the expanded humanitarian regime is to redefine the relevant norms, namely as is appropriate to
the globalizing order, protecting against violations of the laws of war and
human rights on the basis of transnational "humanity" status. t 8
In this regard, the expanded humanitarian regime has normative
dimensions aimed at strengthening international rule of law. While the
present expansion of humanitarian law appears to be a progressive step in
the direction of a global order, 10 9 as currently conceived the new rule of
law is ambivalent. Nevertheless, it might be best understood as a globalizing of the law of war. As discussed above, post-Cold War democratization
and other political transitions followed by not fully consolidated democratic institutionalization have resulted in diminished national sovereignty
and heightened potential for political violence.110 Thus, the emergent regulative regime is largely directed at managing systemic political
violence. 1'It
B. The New Human Security Rights
In the present political circumstances, while the humanitarian law
scheme is centered upon the animating value of "humanity," it is protected
largely in a negative sense."t 2 In this regard, the new "humanitarian"
108. See, e.g., ICC Statute supra note 18, at art. 7(1), defining a "crime against humanity" and providing jurisdiction irrespective of nature of the conflict. Under the Rome
Charter, the "crime against humanity" means inhumane acts "committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." One of the inhumane acts is "persecution" which is defined as "the
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law
by reason of the identity of group or collectivity." Id. at art. 7(2)(g). According to the
Charter of the current- ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "crimes against
humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature .. .committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called ethnic cleansing. See ICTY Statute, supra
note 23, at 1173 art. 48; see also Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against
Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999); Ruti Teitel,
The Universal and the Particularin International Criminaljustice, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 285 (1999). See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE

(2000).

109. See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 8; HELD ET AL., supra note 3 (noting among other
things, that there is a debate about whether globalization as an analytical construct
delivers any added value in the search for a coherent understanding of the historical
forces shaping the socio-political realties of everyday life).
110. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. To illustrate, these political conditions
were particularly evident in the Balkans. See generally JOWITT, supra note 6 (discussing
the character, development, extinction, and legacy of the Leninist phenomenon).
111. On globalization as a regime of military governance, see generally HELD ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 87-149.

112. On the notion of humanitarian rights as the basis of "human security," see
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regime is paradoxical because although it implies greater enforcement of
rights, the relevant "rights" are limited to those of the most urgent nature,
namely those that protect personal integrity from extreme persecution and
extermination. 1 13 In some regard, the instant humanitarian rights are so
unsubstantial that it seems incoherent to conceive of them as "rights" at all
because they are the minimum personal security rights associated with the
rule of law. To whatever extent, the emergent humanitarianism is the guarantee of "liberalism" in the new global order. It is a "liberalism of fear," a
1 14
global spin on the night watchman state.
Although framed in the language of individual rights, the law of
humanity does not necessarily offer an affirmative understanding of "universal" human rights. Instead, the new humanitarian regime protects
1
"humanity," in terms of the "peoples" that make up global humanity. 15
While the hybridized regime is nominally in the language of individual
human rights, the particular rights protected such as those regarding "persecution" and "ethnic cleansing" are peculiarly and impliedly rights predicated on the collective. 116 This is the peculiar relevance of the
humanitarian regime in the present transition to globalization. The emergent legal regime grounds "humanity" rights not on nationality or universal
moral notions, but instead upon a shared rule of law baseline represented
1 17
by the historical law of war.
C. A New Minorities Regime
Further as is explicated above, while the "rights" defined in the new
humanitarian law are individual rights of a group character, they are also
linked to territorial stability."l 8 The expanded humanitarian regime
reaches beyond the longstanding international legal regulation of state soVDER 17-18 (2002). On humanitarianism's protections, see generally Jean S. Pictet, Red
Cross Principles, ICRC, Geneva, 1956, 14-31, also available at www.icrc.org.

113. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 5-8.
114. For a political theory of rights based on freedom from fear, see Judith N. Shklar,
The Liberalism of Fear,in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
1989) (proposing a nexus exists between political crises and theories of justice). For
this negative view of humanity as a source of international criminal law, see generally
STEVEN RATNER &JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: ATROCITIES IN INTER-

NATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY 46-49 (2d ed. 2001).

115. For historical discussion, see Pictet, supra note 112 at 14-31. See also HANNAH
ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 268 (1994) (discuss-

ing the charge against Eichmann in precisely these terms, in particular, in the account of
the "destruction of the Jewish people." Arendt strives to explicate how aiming to destroy
a "people" constitutes an attack on humanity).
116. Thus, under the rubric of individual rights against "persecution," the humanitarian regime impliedly offers broader recognition of "peoples" under international law.
117. This is evident, in particular, in the evolution of the "crime against humanity."
For the historical conceptualization, see Nuremberg Charter, art. 6(c) (applying only to
the persecution during the war); Van Schaack, supra note 108.
118. The proposed "Rome Standards of the International Criminal Court" defines a
"crime against humanity" as "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... grounds...." See ICC
Statute, supra note 18, at art. 7.
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ereignty to protect the territorial stability of ethnic and other groups. 119
Insofar as the expanded humanitarian regime defines new norms, relating
to the treatment of "peoples" it destabilizes international law's historic
nexus between international security with national sovereignty. 120
However, the scope of transnational rule of law protection is limited to
the preservative right against the transfer of ethnic collectives from their
present territory, directed at maintaining population permanence.' 2 1 In
this regard, the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention is best
understood as a principle that limits the existing international system of
state sovereignty. The regime is a rule of law apt for a concededly more
interconnected world, particularly due to its proposed limiting of ethnic
politics on a humanitarian basis, which introduces a normative ceiling on
the longstanding political principles of nationalism and self-determination
guiding the international realm.
As such, the expanded humanitarian scheme constitutes a minorities
regime for the global age. 122 Offering an enforceable standard for the protection of persecuted groups, the contemporary humanitarian scheme limits national jurisdiction and extends international jurisdiction beyond its
traditional scope. In the emergent minorities scheme, the new gravamen of
119. For the definition of "ethnic cleansing," see Final Report of the Commission of
Experts Established Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex,, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 at 33 [hereinafter Annex, Final Report] (defining "ethnic cleansing" as a
purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and
terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from
certain geographic areas").
120. See supra notes 4 and 8. However, see the U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, referring to the
rights of "self-determination of peoples."
121. On population permanence and the definition of the state, see IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 569-75 (5th ed. 1998).
122. Historically, the "minority treaties" were the conventional law that provided
international law protection of national minorities. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly following the first World War, countries entered into socalled minority treaties that usually protected ethnic minorities within states. See, e.g.,
Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 64.
In the post-World War II statutes, the definition of the protective group or collective
has expanded beyond nationality-to race and religion. See, e.g., International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951). Article 1 of the ICESCR guarantees the rights of "all peoples," but does not
mention ethnicity per se as a protected class. Article 2 notes that "race, color, religion
...[or] national or social origin" are protected statuses. See also ICC Statute, supra note
18, at art. 7(l)(h) (defining "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . .or other grounds" as a
crime against humanity).
Recent codifications responding to contemporary ethnic conflicts further expand the
definition of the protected "group." See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. CTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, Sept. 2, 1998, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998) (applying the Genocide
Convention Article 2 to all "stable and permanent" groups); Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 998 (1999). For discussion of these precedents see
William A. Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 6 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 375
(2000).
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"international" jurisdiction protects territorial borders on the basis of
nationality as well as ethnicity and related bases.' 2 3 In this new regime,
the historical rule of law norm in the international sphere, namely the protection of national sovereignty within the borders of the nation-state, is
complemented by an alternative norm that links territorial protection with
the rights of "peoples." Premising international jurisdiction on ethnicity
implies the extension of preservative rights under international law beyond
their preexisting nexus with nationality in two ways.
First, and perhaps the most evident, international law is being
extended beyond the nation-state borders. The second, less transparent
dimension goes to the substantive right at stake, namely under what circumstances and basis international protection is accorded. 124 While "peoples" have not yet acquired full personality under international law, the
new humanitarian regime to some extent implicitly recognizes their pro125
tected status under the law.
However, the emphasis on ethnicity has significant consequences.
Legalists argue that the law can be used to depoliticize ethnicity through
the use of the criminal law and its attribution of individual responsibility
for ethnic-based persecution. 126 However, their argument is flawed insofar
as the offenses that are often at issue, such as massive persecution, tend to
involve systemic policy. These policies of systematic persecution involve a
mix of individual and collective responsibility. Further, when the law aims
to deter future persecution it nevertheless creates the risk that representation of ethnic persecution, albeit in the juridical context, may further
12 7
ethnicize the political discourse.
The present reversion to international treaties that sound in minorities' regimes illuminates the extent to which the new international law is
analogous to and associated with the juridical conditions of the early twentieth century multinational regime. The twentieth century dramatically
displayed the failure of the minorities' regime associated with multinational empires. Nevertheless, a form of minorities' regime is occurring in
globalization's analogous and unstable political conditions.' 28 The new
123. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A
ConstructivistApproach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 414 (1998) (discussing "indigenous peoples"); Schabas, supra note 122.
124. This is evident in the definition of "ethnic cleansing" under international law.
See Annex, Final Report, supra note 119, at 33 (defining "ethnic cleansing" as a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terrorinspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas). See ICTY Statute, supra note 23, at art. 48; see also Van Schaack,
supra note 108; Teitel, supra note 21.
125. For a philosophical discussion, see generally RAWLS, supra note 35.
126. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 12 (Oct. 9, 1995), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/inde.htm (hearing on Rule 61); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 121, at 183-89.
127. See Teitel, supra note 21 (discussing the ICTY and proposing that the proceedings "fall short because they cannot offer the thick form of reconciliation necessary for
reconstructing a community inhabited by citizens." Id. at 189).
128. For a more comprehensive argument for empire theory, see MICHAEL HARDT &
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000) (arguing that sovereignty has taken a new form, com-
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humanitarian regime contemplates a tiered approach to the rule of law
whereby states are initially responsible for the protection of their minorities; however, the regime also lays a basis for international intervention
should the states' national mechanisms fail. International intervention is
deemed preferable to destabilizing ethnic secession, or transnational intervention. However, where human rights standards are linked to the humanitarian regime-in particular to its distinctive enforcement mechanismsthe hybrid legal system potentially threatens the independent normative
status of human rights law. Indeed, the risk of normative conflict is evident in the mixed regime's extension of the bases for humanitarian intervention.' 29 The next Part illustrates some of the potential for normative
conflict and discusses the full policy implications of changes that are not
1 30
yet fully transparent.
Foreign Policymaking in the Shadow of the Law

IV.

This Part illustrates the context for foreign policymaking in the
shadow of the law by exploring the recent humanitarian dilemmas in the
Balkans and Rwanda. An examination of these scenarios highlights the
role of humanitarian law and some of the problems created by its indeterminacy and risks of politicization. As a rule of law for periods of political
change, the new regime both constrains and enables state power in addition to providing a basis for unilateral state military intervention.
A.

Rethinking Security

The new international legalism has a normative impact on global
politics because the changing rule of law both constrains and enables exercises of state power. The emerging juridical regime transforms the prevailing historical view of international rule of law premised upon the
protection of national sovereignty and the borders of the nation-state. This
development seems to challenge state sovereignty since the new humanitarian rights contemplate the penetration of conventional state sovereignty
and territoriality in order to protect persecuted collectives.131 In the new
global scheme, violations of ethnic sovereignty are no longer regarded as
posed of a series of national and super-national organisms united under a single logic
rule, and that the new global form of sovereignty is what they call "empire." It establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It
is a decentralized and deterritorializingapparatus of rule that progressively incorporates
the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers." Id. at xii).
129. See infra notes 154-72 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
131.

There is an expanding literature on humanitarian intervention. See FRANCIS KOFI

ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

(1999);

GRAY,

supra note 72,

at

24-51;

SEAN

D.

MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
(1997); BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMEN-

THE UNrrED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER

FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTER(2d ed. 1997); Antonio Cassese, A FollowUp: Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
791 (1999); NATO's Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 824, 824-60 (1999); W.
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive ProTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1999);
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domestic matters, but as matters of consequence for the international
community.
However, the humanitarian scheme creates divergent and complex
conflicts for state sovereignty because the regime both constrains and
enables state power. The new legalism offers an ongoing justificatory
apparatus for unilateral and multilateral international intervention. As
such the new regime, while explicitly oriented towards peace and stability,
also predicates norms that offer new bases for the exercise of state power
and military intervention based on humanitarian grounds. These legal
developments signal a marked change in the meaning of security in the
international realm.
While human rights are often juxtaposed against state security inter132
ests,
under the new humanitarian scheme that juxtaposition presents a
complex tension. The new humanitarianism redefines the meaning of
international security by substituting the longstanding understanding of
security as protection of state borders with a transformed construction
grounded in the discourse of human rights. Under the new humanitarian
scheme, preservative human rights operate as proxies for national borders
in a globalizing politics. The humanitarian rights at stake are "preservative" in two senses. First, these rights protect against persecution and ethnic cleansing in order to preserve a collective's ability to survive. Second,
these rights promote population permanence and residence in particular
territories. 133 As such, human rights under the new humanitarian scheme
constitute set juridical constructs of state borders that redefine the meaning of security in global politics. For instance, a threat to a collective's
preservative rights may affect the permanence of that population, thus
endangering peaceful global coexistence. It is precisely this threat that
would otherwise not be protected under the currently prevailing rule of law
norm of state self-determination, which might well point instead to ethnic
secession. The expansion of international jurisdiction aims to stabilize the
global order by protecting against the persecution and migration of peoples, threats to territorial integrity in surrounding areas aid the balance of
political power in the global order. Under the new humanitarian regime,
the protected ethnic and other group-related rights limit the currently prevailing ethos of self-determination as the defining dimension of security in
the international realm, in so doing redefining and broadening the meaning of stability and security in international law and the global order.
As previously discussed, the political effect of the humanitarian
regime's legal developments is to protect threshold preservative rights. The
new humanitarianism allows for a rethinking of the public and private by
regulating internal state conflicts. However, the extent to which it does so
is highly limited because the newly expanded humanitarian regime takes
cess: The Special Problem of HumanitarianIntervention, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (2000). For
applications and discussion, see infra Part IV(B).
132. For one such argument about the contemporary conflict see Michael Ignatieff, Is
the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A25.
133. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at art. 5.
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the present territorial status quo as a given. Moreover, under the humanitarian regime the question of how economic security relates to military and
territorial security is not contestable; 134 instead, the apparent role of the
new rule of law is to sustain the status quo, reinforcing the present territo135
rial balance of global politics, while facilitating globalization processes.
The emergence of the instant juridical regime, discussed here in contemporary globalizing conditions involving extensive migration of capital rights,
reflects that these expectations do not abide in regard to the movement of
peoples.' 3 6 Just the reverse, the juridical developments discussed here are
best understood, not as articulations of ideal human rights norms, but
rather as provisional measures simply aimed at managing the present situation of heightened disorder associated with contemporary globalizing politics in the international realm.
B. From the Borders of the State to those of the Collective
The above understanding of the implications of the current humanitarian rule of law also resonates in some liberal political theorizing, which
reflects uncharacteristically chastened expectations. For example, in The
Law of Peoples John Rawls offers a plausible standard for global rule of law
by presenting a largely positive account of human rights' role in present
political realities.' 3 7 In The Law of Peoples, Rawlsian human rights operate
as a preservative norm, a floor that functions largely to maintain the prevailing values and structure of present international relations. 138 Principles of national sovereignty and self-determination in the international
realm continue to occupy a central role. 139 Also, the uses of "human
rights" as the basis for international rule of law are strictly limited to justifying humanitarian intervention as a response to "expansionist" policiesnevertheless the Rawlsian emendation is to conceive of the contemporary
understanding of what constitutes "expansionism" to extend within
national borders. 140 Here again as previously discussed, 14 1 a contemporary version of the historical minorities regimes emerges in the "law of peoples."'1 4 2 Thus, the relevant protected rights are "peoples" rights-namely
extensions of collective rights to self-determination beyond nationality to
134. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 111 (exhorting globalization as an opportunity for
deliberation over social justice).
135. Rights against persecution and ethnic cleansing are "group rights" and implicate
property rights, see generally RAWLS supra note 35.
136. Indeed, this understanding builds on traditional definitions of the state in terms
of permanence of populations. See HELD ET AL., supra note 3.
137. See RAWLS, supra note 35, at 25-30 (proposing a view of justice in the international order conceived in terms of "peoples" rather than "states").
138. Id.
139. Id. (espousing traditional statist views and comparing it to his theory of the "law
of peoples").
140. See id. at 37-38.
141. See supra Part II1, note 126.
142. For discussion of the interwar minorities' regime, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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other ascriptive bases, such as ethnicity. 14 3 Protection of these rights is
1 44
used to justify international intervention.
Rawl's positive approach to global rule of law, which draws from present political practices, is a far cry from more aspirational cosmopolitan
schemes.14 5 Although both schemes conceive contemporary human rights
in terms of bases that are independent of exclusive state sovereignty, cosmopolitan schemes go much farther in conceptualizing an affirmative constitutive role of human rights operating independent of bases analogous to
46
the principles of state sovereignty and nationality.'
C.

Illustrations

This Article has discussed the ways in which the present understanding of international rule of law is now undergoing a paradigm shift. This
section addresses how these changes are beginning to influence foreign
policy discourse, 1 4 7 evincing the paradigm shift in the conception of rule
of law. Recent foreign policy deliberations reflect varying assumptions
about the meaning of international rule of law. The statist view is associated with adherence to longstanding understandings of state sovereignty
through the maintenance of international order through the principle of
geopolitical stability. In contrast, the new humanitarian standards treat
the invocation of the principle of state sovereignty as a rationalization for
lawlessness and consider rule of law to depend on the potential of greater
international intervention. 14 8 On one hand, humanitarian intervention
could be a slippery slope because it threatens the stability of the international order. On the other hand, such intervention is crucial to maintaining rule of law in the international realm. These competing views of rule of
law, apparently contradictory and irreconcilable, represent the currently
shifting paradigm.
143. See ICC Statute, supra note 18, at arts. 5-8.
144. See supra note 35.
145. For an explanation of what cosmopolitan law entails, see HELD ET AL., supra note
3, at 70-74 (explaining that cosmopolitan law refers to "those elements of law-albeit
created by states-which create powers and constraints, and rights and duties, which
transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national consequences." These elements are meant to define and protect basic human rights values
that no political agent should in principle be able to cross). Id. at 70. The cosmopolitan
project attempts to specify the principles and the institutional arrangements for making
sites and forms of power, which presently operate beyond the scope of democratic control. Id. at 449-50. For examples of the cosmopolitan approach, see CHARLES R. BEITZ,
POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (advocating a cosmopolitan
approach); STANLEY HOFFMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

(1996); Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U.

MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992). See generally CHARLOTTE BRETHERTON & GEOFFREY PONTON, GLOBAL POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1996).

146. Such as ethnicity, race or religion. See Kingsbury, supra note 123; Schabas, supra
note 122.
147. For a discussion of the "legalist" paradigm in foreign relations, see WALZER, supra

note 70, at 58-62.
148. See generally BEITZ, supra note 145.
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International deliberations concerning the human rights crises in the
former Yugoslavia and Africa illustrate the tragic choices that accompany
rule of law dilemmas. The events in Bosnia and Rwanda were instances of
international inaction, despite apparently universally accepted imperatives
against gross and systematic rights violations, and thus were evident failures of the international legal order. t 4 9 In contrast, although lacking full
legality due to the absence of a United Nations mandate, humanitarian
actions taken in Kosovo reflected a newly emerging legitimacy. 15 0 The gap
between what traditionally constituted legality in the international legal
system, namely protection of national sovereignty and a new understanding of legitimacy, signals the contradictions in the prevailing meaning of
rule of law in the international realm.
Recent deliberations by the international community over humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo reflect the expanded role
of international law in policy discourse. The relevant policy debates
regarding these crises were informed by changing assumptions about the
meaning of international rule of law. The crises brought home the extent
to which the preexisting international system was inapt to handle postCold War dilemmas by underscoring the lack of an international military
or other alternative enforcement mechanisms and spurring the present
momentum for change in the international legal regime in light of the cur5
rent shift in global power relations.'1 '
The dilemmas, chiefly in the Balkans, over humanitarian intervention
reflect the contestation over and transformation of the meaning of international rule of law. t52 While in the old "Westphalian" political order, rule of
law in international affairs was defined largely in terms of state interests in
149. See Rwanda Report, supra note 19; Implications of International Response to
Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General,in Address to General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg., reprinted in U.N. Press Release GA/9595 (1999) (providing highlights of the Secretary-General's opening address to the General Assembly).
In his opening address, Secretary-General Kofi Annan was notably among those calling
for humanitarian intervention-statements giving rise to the so-called Annan Doctrine.
See, e.g., A GLOBAL AGENDA: IssuEs BEFORE THE 55TH GENERAL. ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 1 (John Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 2000); Secretary-GeneralPresents His
Annual Report to the General Assembly, reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136 GA/
9596 (1999); Secretary-GeneralCalls For Renewed Commitment in New Century to Protect
Rights of Man, Woman, Child- Regardless of Ethnic, National Belonging, reprinted in U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/6949 HR/CN/898 (1999); Secretary-GeneralSays Renewal of Effectiveness and Relevance of the Security Council Must be Cornerstone of Efforts to Promote
InternationalPeace in Next Century, reprinted in U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6997 (1999).
150. See supra note 6; Kosovo Report, supra note 28, at 186; see also Statement on the
Situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, issued by the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1999/451 (1999) (arguing that
the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and, thus,
for authorizing the use of force in a humanitarian intervention rests with the U.N. Security Council).
151. This awareness has been underscored post-September 11.
152. Report of the Secretary-Generalto Security Council on the Protectionof Civilians in
Armed Conflict, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/957, at 7 (1999) [hereinafter SecretaryGeneral's Report].
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self-determination, 153 in contemporary transforming politics the protection of this norm no longer adequately comprehends the sense of adherence to global rule of law. To the contrary, under the new regime, the
primary basis of illegality under the prior system, namely penetrating
54
national sovereignty, may well be treated as justified intervention.'
Indeed, recent human rights crises illuminate the changing norm
regarding the meaning of international rule of law. 155 Under the new
humanitarian regime, the relevant policy questions run the gamut from
when humanitarian intervention may be justified to when it might be
required-law itself is deemed to define the peace. Justice's aim transcends
the backward looking to do forward-looking work. To illustrate, the international adjudications ongoing in the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia introduced a remarkable aim for international law:
advancing the aim of "deterrence" of prospective humanitarian tragedies
through international criminal processes as a way to achieve peace and
reconciliation of ethnic conflict in the international realm. 156 Standing
alone, the notion that international law is the way to peace is not new1 57
indeed this was a traditional belief common to the nineteenth century.
However, what is new is the notion that law itself can define what constitutes peace and stability internationally, and further that it could somehow
displace politics to resolve international conflict. 15 8 The justification for
applying international criminal law may constitute a facile extension of
domestic criminal legal rationales of deterrence, 1' 9 yet at the international
level, the success of these legal mechanisms remains largely unproven.
Indeed, heinous massacres continued in the Balkans despite ongoing prosecutions at the ad hoc Yugoslavia Tribunal proceedings. 160 Similar doubts
persist about the effects of legal responses relating to the Rwandan genocide. 16 1 These instances raise doubts about any direct nexus regarding
153. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2; WALZER, supra note 70.
154. See infra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
155. See id.
156. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
157. See SHKLAR, supra note 45, at 129 (noting that in the nineteenth century "[i]t was
urged not only that international law was a means to peace, but that it was the only road
to that end. All other forms of political action not only could be neglected; they were
regarded as undesirable"). See TUCK, supra note 75; Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 105 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B.
Nisbet trans., 1977).
158. ICC Statute, supra note 18, at Preamble.
159. See Teitel supra note 47, at 33-39, 49-51. Here the analogy to domestic law is
thin. The role of law is not unitary, and its domestic functions are differentiable from its
international role.
160. This was most glaring at the time of the Srebrenica massacre. See Teitel, supra
note 21, at 178; see also Security Council Strongly Condemns HumanitarianLaw Violations
by Bosnian Serbs, Paramilitary Forces; Cites Summary Executions, Mass Expulsions,
reprinted in U.N. Press Release SC/6149 (1995) available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/1995/19951221.sc6149.html; Security Council Condemns Continued Grave
Human Rights Violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, reprinted in U.N. Press
Release SC/6122/Rev. 1* (1995), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
1995/19951109.sc6122.rl.html.
161. See, e.g., Rwanda Report, supra note 19.
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international criminal justice and the advancement of global rule of law.
Finally, there are less transparent dimensions of the new humanitarian discourse, particularly how the new rule of law constitutes both a constraint and an expansion of the exercise of power and, in turn,
international relations. The legal developments described above ultimately
point to a marked expansion of the law of conflict. 162 Whereas historically
international humanitarian law was limited to rationalizing the use of force
after the fact, 16 3 the current expanded regime would come in earlier and
potentially play a broader role in policy deliberations. While the new international rule of law does not necessarily reflect a political consensus on
humanitarian intervention, the emergent legal regime does lay the basis for
its potential uses. The new humanitarian regime manifestly expands upon
the historical bases for humanitarian intervention, namely the protection
of state self-determination, 16 4 to include other bases such as the protection
of internal minorities.' 65 This change subtly shifts the political debate
regarding humanitarian rights cases, thus allowing for a growing interventionism. Perhaps, this is to be expected in a globalizing and thus more
interconnected international order.
This development was evident on the international relations road from
Bosnia to Kosovo. In a report on recent humanitarian crises, United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that human rights abuses,
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and threats of genocide, constitute legitimate justifications for Security Council intervention under
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, he asserted that scope
is a leading factor on which to predicate a recommendation of intervention
based on breaches of the new humanitarian law. 166 Therefore the broader
the bases for adjudicating humanitarian law, the broader the bases for military intervention-one justifies the other. The exploding bullet of the new
humanitarian regime is that it ostensibly offers a legal and nonviolent
means to uphold the rule of law while also laying a basis for justifying
potential military intervention, should the political will for such action
emerge. The legalization of NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrates the
potential power of the new regime, 16 7 because there policymaking reflected
well be perceptibly illegal,
clashing views of rule of law and thus what may
168
was nevertheless legitimate in the public eye.
162. See supra note 131.

163. See WALZER, supra note 70.
164. See MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEw WORLD ORDER
(1992).
165. See supra notes 69-79.
166. See Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 152, at para. 67.
167. See U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998), U.N.
SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess.,
33937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); see generally Henkin, supra note 64.
168. The ultimate legitimacy of the NATO intervention is still a matter of substantial
controversy. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention
in Kosovo, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 834 (1999) (arguing the intervention's "legality remains
questionable" and "presents an unfortunate precedent"); Thomas M. Franck, Sidelined in
Kosovo: The United Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated; Break it, Don't Fake it, 78
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The question arises as to what extent the potential for humanitarian
intervention comes into conflict with the core international law commitment against the use of force. Humanitarian intervention is generally considered to pose a challenge to the United Nations' Charter's commitment to
state sovereignty, 169 as recognized by the conclusions of the Independent
Commission on Kosovo's finding that NATO intervention was "illegal yet
legitimate."' 170 However, as the above discussion suggests the global rule of
law comprehends multiple values. The fact that the same norms can pull
in potentially conflicting directions underscores the indeterminacy and
extent to which the global rule of law, as it is currently framed, constitutes
a highly manipulable regime that lends itself to politicization. In this
regard, reliance on an international judiciary and discourse of justice
reflects a concern for the appearance of principled decision-making
processes in foreign affairs. The new humanitarianism advances the construction of a normative international discourse. Understood in discursive
terms, the enhancement of international legalism expresses the sense that
there is a regulation of the international realm, a legitimate international
law, and an international community with shared threshold norms.
Conclusion
The new humanitarianism walks a thin line. The emerging legal system is intended to advance the goal of rationalizing foreign policy decisionmaking and to assist in the legitimization of the new globalizing order.
However, the enterprise has troubling ramifications that are not readily
transparent. To a large extent, the humanitarian regime aims to ensure
minimal preservative rights that rationalize the protection of the territorial
status quo in contemporary foreign affairs. Beyond the role of the law as
constraint, the proposed regime would also authorize the expansion of the
bases for military intervention beyond its historical goal of protecting
national sovereignty to the broader goal of protecting collectives in ways
that are likely to become politicized. Finally, the emergence of an
expanded humanitarian regime threatens to erode the human rights discourse and value system, which was formerly an independent perspective
that allowed for normative critique of the global rule of law in prevailing
political realities.
FOREIGN AFF. 116 (1999); Henkin, supra note 64; Reisman, supra note 131; John Yoo,

What's Wrong with InternationalLaw Scholarship? The Dogs That Didn't Bark: Why Were
InternationalLegal Scholars MIA on Kosovo? 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 149 (2000) (arguing this
exemplified a politicized rule of law).
169. See also Peter Hilpold, Humanitarian Intervention: Is there a Need for a Legal
Reappraisal? 12 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 437, 437-67 (2001) (discussing arguments for a new
right to humanitarian intervention, and arguing that despite its shortcomings the prohibition of the use of force in the U.N. Charter may constitute a better protection than its
abandonment). See generally Henkin supra, note 64.
170. Kosovo REPORT, supra note 28, at 186. For a critical view, see Alfred P. Rubin,
Book Review, 6 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 147-55 (2001) (critiquing THE INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, Kosovo REPORT (2000)).

